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Introduction
Natural outbreaks of disease could pose signiﬁ  cant 
challenges to global security by undermining national 
economies, international trade and travel, public health 
and safety, and the trust of populace in its own govern-
ment, potentially leading to ineﬀ   ective governance or 
fragile state collapse. Th   e global biological threat environ-
ment is compounded by the possibility of rogue states 
and/or terrorists deliberately using biological agents as 
weapons of war. Any such use of a biological agent 
(whether overtly or covertly) could have potentially devas-
tating consequences on public health or the environ  ment. 
Achieving eﬀ  ective, comprehensive biosecurity to prevent 
unauthorized possession, loss, theft, misuse, diversion, or 
intentional release of biological agents and toxins is a 
shared responsibility at the international level since 
infectious disease knows no borders.
Biosafety is complementary to biosecurity, and refers to 
the implementation of laboratory practices and proce-
dures, speciﬁ   c construction features of laboratory 
facilities, safety equipment, and appropriate occupational 
health programs when working with potentially 
infectious microorganisms and other biological hazards. 
Th  ese measures are designed to reduce the exposure of 
laboratory personnel, the public, agriculture, and the 
environment to potentially infectious agents and other 
biological hazards. Laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) 
have also started to receive more attention in recent 
years, in particular with regard to high (biosafety level 3, 
or BSL-3) and maximum (BSL-4) containment labora-
tories. LAIs may occur in research labs, clinical labs, or 
animal facilities, and sometimes it is diﬃ   cult to deter-
mine whether the infection was acquired in the lab or 
from the community. Th   ere is also a strong public health 
concern related to the LAIs, as an infected laboratory 
worker may transmit the infectious disease to his 
colleagues, family, or community at large [1]. Poor 
personnel training increases the risk of a LAI or other 
biological accident in the laboratory, and may also 
contribute to improper pathogen accounting, storage and 
transportation, which in turn could contribute to the 
illicit acquisition of biological agents by terrorists or 
would-be bio-criminals.
Abstract
The critical aspects of biosafety, biosecurity, and 
biocontainment have been in the spotlight in recent 
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1540 overlap in their requirements with regard to 
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Public HealthSince there is no single technology or process that 
could be applied to prevent or deter the use of biological 
agents as weapons, the implementation of international 
instruments for nonproliferation (such as the Biological 
Weapons Convention and United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1540) and public health (such as the 
International Health Relations) summarized in Figure 1, 
as well as the establishment of regional and international 
partnerships in countering biological threats (whether 
natural, accidental or deliberate in nature), are critical 
factors in achieving global health security. Th  e pillars 
supporting the global health security are biosafety and 
biosecurity as they transcend unique national concerns 
and stand at the nexus of public health and security. Th  is 
paper discusses each of these international instruments 
in detail, and then presents how Georgia is using these 
instruments to promote biosafety and biosecurity.
Biosafety and biosecurity under the International 
Health Regulations (2005)
Th  e International Health Regulations (IHR), the legally-
binding international agreement designed to prevent the 
spread of disease, were revised and adopted in their new 
form by the 58th World Health Assembly (WHA) on 23 
May 2005. Th   e purpose and scope of the IHR(2005) are 
“to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public 
health response to the international spread of disease in 
ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public 
health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference 
with international traﬃ   c and trade.” [2]. Th   e revised IHR 
apply to diseases (including those with new and unknown 
causes), irrespective of origin or source, that present 
signiﬁ  cant harm to humans, and oﬀ  er the international 
community new opportunities to strengthen the public 
health capacities and collaborate with other countries 
and with the World Health Organization (WHO).
Following the entry into force of the IHR(2005) in 2007, 
States Parties are required to meet the core capacity 
requirements as soon as possible, but no later than ﬁ  ve 
years from the entry into force of the Regulations. As of 
15 June 2007, States Parties had two years to assess their 
national structures and resources and develop national 
action plans, and as of 15 June 2009, States Parties have 
three years to meet the core capacity requirements. Core 
capacity 8, the laboratory core capacity, refers to those 
laboratory quality services relying on communication, 
specimen collection and transport, ﬁ  nancial resources, 
biosafety and biosecurity best practices, trained 
Figure 1. Biosafety and biosecurity are essential pillars of international health security and cross-cutting elements of biological 
nonproliferation.
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and reagents, and the delivery of reliable results.
Th  e WHO also developed a framework for States 
Parties to monitor the development of the 8 core capa-
cities (through assessment and implementation), which 
includes a checklist of indicators that can be used for 
annual reporting on the IHR implementation to the 
WHA in accordance with Article 54.1 of the Regulations, 
and also for better targeting of WHO and Partner 
support to countries (see Table 1) [3]. Th  ese indicators 
are also meant to provide information about areas of 
focus for improvement and inform the strategic planning 
via a feedback process. Speciﬁ   cally, the framework 
provides: i) a set of 20 global indicators for monitoring 
the development of IHR core capacities for annual 
reporting to the WHA by all States Parties (mandatory 
for all); and ii) an additional 10 indicators for monitoring 
the comprehensive development, strengthening, and main-
tenance of States Parties’ IHR core capacities (optional).
Building laboratory capacity to support a public health 
system cannot be done eﬀ  ectively without a strong focus 
on biosafety. Th  e WHA had highlighted this issue in 
several resolutions, listed in Table 2.
A national health security strategy intended to protect 
the population against public health emergencies must 
consider a diverse spectrum of threats, including 
endemic diseases, natural outbreaks or pandemics, acci-
dents involving biological agent release, bioterrorism 
attacks, and biological warfare, all of them having a wide 
range of potential consequences. Whether preparing for 
a natural or a deliberate event, the common denominator 
is the need for a robust and timely response, and adaptive 
public health system that will provide early warning and 
an eﬃ   cient medical response.
Implementation of the consistent policies, operating 
procedures and the operational and technical capacity 
required by the IHR(2005) will help ensure early warning 
and eﬃ   cient international management of a biological 
incident, whether naturally occurring or deliberate in 
nature, thereby promoting our national health security. 
Laboratory-based surveillance and outbreak detection 
are essential to the prevention and mitigation of bio-
logical threats, and quality laboratory services are 
dependent on the implementation of biosafety and 
biosecurity best practices supported by an appropriate 
legal framework.
Biosafety and biosecurity under the Biological 
Weapons Convention
Th  e Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), formally 
known as the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacterio-
logical (Biological) and Toxin Weapons  and on Th  eir 
Destruction (aka the Biological and Toxin Weapons Con-
vention), was the ﬁ   rst multilateral disarmament treaty 
that banned the production and use of an entire category 
Table 1. IHR (2005) checklist of indicators for annual 
reporting to WHA. Biosafety and biosecurity are included 
under indicator 13.
20 indicators for annual reporting to WHA
1.  Laws, regulations, administrative requirements, policies or other 
government instruments in place are suffi   cient for implementation of 
obligations under the IHR.
2.  A mechanism is established for the coordination of relevant sectors in 
the implementation of the IHR.
3.  IHR National Focal Point (NFP) functions and operations are in place as 
defi  ned by the IHR(2005).
4.  Indicator-based routine surveillance includes an early warning function 
for the early detection of public health events.
5.  Event-based surveillance is established.
6.  Public health emergency response mechanisms are established.
7.  Infection prevention and control (IPC) is established at national and 
hospital levels.
8.  A multi-hazard National Public Health Emergency Preparedness and 
Response Plan has been developed.
9.  Public health risks and resources are mapped.
10.  Mechanisms for eff  ective risk communication during a public health 
emergency are established.
11.  Human resources are available to implement IHR core capacity 
requirements.
12.  Laboratory services to test for priority health threats are available and 
accessible.
13.  Laboratory biosafety and biosecurity practices are in place.
14. Eff  ective surveillance is established at Points of Entry (PoE).
15. Eff  ective response is established at PoE.
16.  General obligations at PoE are fulfi  lled.
17.  Mechanisms are established for detecting and responding to zoonoses 
and potential zoonoses.
18.  Mechanisms are established for detecting and responding to foodborne 
disease and food contamination.
19.  Mechanisms are established for detection, alert and response to 
chemical emergencies.
20.  Mechanisms are established for detecting and responding to 
radiological and nuclear emergencies.
Table 2. WHA resolutions on biosafety.
WHA resolutions
•  World Health Assembly resolution 55.16 (2002):
    “Global public health response to natural occurrence, accidental 
    release or deliberate use of biological and chemical agents or 
    radionuclear material that aff  ect health”
•  World Health Assembly resolution 58.3 (2005):
    “Prevention and control of the international spread of disease and 
  public  health  risks”
•  World Health Assembly resolution 58.29 (2005):
    “Enhancement of laboratory biosafety”
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and entered into force on 26 March 1975 [4].
Th  e BWC States Parties hold Review Conferences 
every ﬁ  ve years (1980, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, and 2006, 
with the next one to be held in 2011). Between these 
Review Conferences, States Parties have pursued various 
activities and initiatives to strengthen the eﬀ  ectiveness 
and improve the implementation of the Convention. For 
example, the 2006 BWC Sixth Review Conference 
created the 2007-2010 intersessional process, which 
consists of four sets of annual meetings prior to the 
Seventh Review Conference (each set includes a one-
week Meeting of Experts, followed by a one-week 
Meeting of States Parties); established the Implemen-
tation Support Unit (ISU); established an action plan for 
universalization and improving national implementation; 
improved the Conﬁ   dence Building Measures (CBM) 
information exchange process; worked on enhancing 
provisions of assistance; and built a network of national 
points of contact.
CBMs were ﬁ  rst agreed upon at the Second Review 
Conference in 1986 “in order to prevent or reduce the 
occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions and in 
order to improve international co-operation in the ﬁ  eld 
of peaceful biological activities.” [5]. Th  e CBMs were 
modiﬁ  ed and considerably expanded in 1991. Th  ey  have 
not been modiﬁ  ed since, though it is expected that the 
Seventh Review Conference in 2011 will undertake a 
signiﬁ  cant review of current CBM forms and content.
Th   e CBMs involve voluntary exchanges of information 
on a range of BWC-related activities, including research 
centers and laboratories, national biological defense 
research and development programs, vaccine production 
facilities, and unusual outbreaks of infectious diseases. 
Since the CBMs are not legally-binding (i.e., not required 
by any article of the Convention), but established only as 
voluntary (politically-binding) measures, participation in 
the CBMs is not universal or consistent from year to year.
In order to ensure that the tenets of the BWC are 
adhered to, States Parties are encouraged to implement 
national legislation to enforce the provisions of the BWC 
to prohibit and prevent the development, production, 
stockpiling, acquisition, retention, transfer or use of 
biological weapons by anyone under their jurisdiction, as 
well as parallel measures to prohibit and prevent 
encouraging, inciting or assisting others in any of these 
acts. However, the precise details of what measures are 
necessary to accomplish these goals and implement the 
provisions of the Convention are at the discretion of 
individual States Parties.
Based on the understandings and agreements reached 
historically at the Review Conferences, national imple-
men  tation of BWC includes legislative, administrative, 
and other measures to enhance domestic compliance 
with the BWC; national export control systems; edu  ca-
tion, awareness raising and outreach measures; disease 
surveillance, detection, and containment; as well as 
biosafety and biosecurity provisions.
In this context, the common understandings reached at 
the 2008 BWC Meeting of States Parties are highly 
relevant: “recognizing that biosafety and biosecurity 
measures contribute to preventing the development, 
acquisition or use of BTW [biological and toxin weapons] 
and are appropriate means of implementing the BWC, 
States Parties agreed on the value of…international 
cooperation on biosafety and biosecurity at the bilateral, 
regional and international levels,” and also that “pursuing 
biosafety and biosecurity measures could also contribute 
to the fulﬁ  llment [by State Parties] of other respective 
international obligations and agreements, such as the 
revised IHR of the WHO, and relevant codes of OIE [the 
International Organization for Animal Health],…[and] 
UNSCR [United Nations Security Council Resolution] 
1540 (2004) that places obligations on all states and is 
consistent with the provisions of the Convention.” [6].
While the understandings and agreements reached 
during the intersessional process are not legally-binding, 
they are nevertheless politically-binding for all States 
Parties. States Parties have the opportunity to report 
under the CBM E (Declaration of legislature, regulations, 
and other measures) the relevant laws, regulations, or 
other measures related to the national biosafety and 
biosecurity framework. Additionally, the CBM D (Active 
promotion of contacts) also oﬀ   ers an opportunity for 
States Parties to promote relevant educational and 
training activities in these areas.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 
(UNSCR 1540)
On 28 April 2004, the UN Security Council unanimously 
adopted UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 
1540) to address the risk that terrorists and illicit net-
works will acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD). UNSCR 1540 established for the ﬁ  rst  time 
legally-binding obligations on all UN Member States to 
develop and to enforce eﬀ   ective measures against the 
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological WMD, 
their means of delivery, and related materials. While 
national implementation eﬀ   orts under the BWC, 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are 
intended to accomplish a similar goal, 1540’s sole 
intention is to create broad-range binding obligations 
regard  ing all three weapon types and avoid the 
negotiation processes and voluntary commitments under 
these treaties. Moreover, it is applicable to all UN 
Member States, regardless of their membership in 
multilateral agreements.
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legal framework that should include the following 
elements:
•  A system to account for and secure items in produc-
tion, use, storage or transport;
• Eﬀ  ective physical protection measures;
• Eﬀ   ective border controls and law enforcement 
measures; and
• Eﬀ  ective national export and trans-shipment controls.
UNSCR 1540 also emphasizes that the international legal 
framework facilitate a strategy of “prevention” based 
upon each individual State accepting “responsibility” for 
implementing measures against the proliferation of 
materials and weapons. Th  is is why UNSCR 1540 also 
requires all States to report on their national 
implementation measures to the 1540 Committee 
established pursuant to the resolution. UNSCR 1673 (27 
April 2006), renewed the 1540 Committee for two 
additional years. In its resolution 1810 (2008), the 
Council decided to extend further the mandate of the 
Committee for a period of three years until 25 April 2011, 
to continue to promote the full implementation by all 
States of resolution 1540 (2004) through its program of 
work, which includes the compilation of information on 
the status of States’ implementation of all aspects of 
resolution 1540 (2004), outreach, dialogue, assistance 
and cooperation. Per UNSCR 1810 (2008), the Com-
mittee would submit to the Council a report no later than 
24 April 2011 on compliance with resolution 1540 (2004) 
through the achievement of the implementation of its 
requirements.
States were asked to submit a ﬁ  rst report, not later than 
six months after the adoption of the resolution 1540, (i.e. 
28 October 2004), on steps they had taken or intended to 
take to implement this resolution. As of 1 July 2008, the 
total number of States that had submitted at least one 
report since 2004 stood at 155 (out of the 192 UN 
Member States). Of those States that had submitted ﬁ  rst 
reports, 102 submitted additional information. Th  irty-
seven States have not submitted a ﬁ   rst report to the 
Committee. Th   e 1540 Committee also acts as a clearing 
house for information on the issue of assistance through 
formal and informal contact and dialogue with all States, 
especially those expressing interest in oﬀ  ering  and 
receiving assistance. Th  e 1540 Committee developed 
matrices to be used as tools for dialogue with States on 
their implementation of the resolution, as well as for 
facilitating technical assistance. A matrix for each UN 
Member State has been prepared. Th  e matrices are 
regularly updated and approved by the Committee.
For example, the matrix for biological weapons and 
related materials identiﬁ   es the following areas where 
domestic controls should be implemented and enforced:
•  Measures to account for/secure production
•  Measures to account for/secure use
•  Measures to account for/secure storage
•  Measures to account for/secure transport
•  Regulations for physical protection of facilities/
materials/transports
• Licensing/registration of facilities/persons handling 
biological materials
•  Reliability check of personnel
• Measures to account for/secure/physically protect 
means of delivery
•  Regulations for genetic engineering work
• Other legislation/regulations related to safety and 
security of biological materials
In response to UNSCR 1810 (2008), the 1540 Committee 
conducted in the Fall of 2009 a Comprehensive Review as 
a forum for all States and relevant intergovernmental 
bodies to share experiences and express their views on 
various aspects of UNSCR 1540 implementation and also 
(i) to assess the evolution of risks and threats; (ii) to 
address speciﬁ   c critical issues that have not yet been 
resolved; and (iii) to identify possible new approaches for 
the implementation of the resolution. Th  e  broad 
participation during the Comprehensive Review included 
formal statements and interventions on speciﬁ  c issues 
made by 41 States and 21 intergovernmental organiza-
tions and other entities. Based on the ﬁ   ndings of the 
Comprehensive Review, the 1540 Committee prepared 
an outcome document with recommendations to the 
Council regarding the implementation of Resolution 
1540. Th   is document acknowledged the signiﬁ  cant 
number of measures that States have taken to implement 
1540 obligations, but identiﬁ   ed some areas in which 
States have adopted fewer measures, such as biological 
weapons, means of delivery, national control lists, and 
access to related materials and ﬁ  nancing of prohibited or 
illicit proliferation activities [7].
Areas covered under the UNSCR 1540-required 
regulatory framework overlap with Georgia’s eﬀ  orts on 
strengthening the current biosafety, biosecurity, and 
biocontainment oversight frameworks aimed at decreas-
ing the risk of terrorist/malevolent acquisition of deadly 
pathogens or accidental release of a biological agent. 
However, the bioterrorism prevention in the context of 
UNSCR 1540 requires continued international support 
toward the shared goals of achieving international health 
security and prohibiting biological nonproliferation.
Georgia’s eff  orts on strengthening national 
biosafety and biosecurity
In order to be comprehensive and ensure an eﬀ  ective 
implementation, a national legislative system on biosafety 
and biosecurity has to be considered in the context of 
other pertinent legislation and extant measures, and 
should have “buy-in” from all relevant stakeholders. In 
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Health and Social Aﬀ  airs (MOHLSA); the Ministry of 
State Security; the Ministry of Interior; and the Ministry 
of Infrastructure.
Ensuring biosafety and biosecurity in Georgia is one of 
the main responsibilities of the National Center for 
Disease Control and Public Health (NCDC), which com-
prises a network of 11 regional and 66 district (rayon) 
Centers for Public Health and also houses the Georgian 
national collection of especially dangerous patho  gens. 
NCDC was built on the foundation of the Georgian 
Station for Plague Control in 1996 and its statute was 
approved by the President of Georgia by Presidential 
Decree 55 on 21 February 2003. NCDC now employs 440 
personnel (60% are specialists with graduate-level 
education).
Th   e designation of NCDC as the National Focal Point 
for the IHR provided a strong renewal of commitment to 
advance the legislative framework for biosafety and 
biosecurity in Georgia in the context of the national 
eﬀ   orts to meet the core capacity requirements of the 
IHR. Moreover, experts from Georgia are very active in 
collaborating with the WHO and other organizations and 
partners in technical consultations related to the IHR. 
For instance, Georgian experts participated in the 
technical consultation on checklist and indicators for 
monitoring progress in the implementation of IHR core 
capacities in Member States organized by WHO in Lyon, 
France, 4-6 August 2009.
Georgia joined the Biological Weapons Convention in 
1995 and has extensive measures in place to ensure that 
all activities on its territory are treaty-compliant and that 
prohibited activities are deterred and detected and 
perpetrators are punished. Th   e basic tenets and 
understandings reached in the BWC intersessional 
process are implemented by Georgia through:
•  Legislation and regulations;
•  Biosafety and biosecurity;
•  Oversight of life sciences research;
• Education and awareness of dual use issues and 
biological risk;
•  Disease surveillance, containment, and response.
In addition, Georgia participates in the CBM process 
(submitting eight annual reports since it ratiﬁ  ed  the 
treaty) and is actively involved in the BWC intersessional 
process (conducting joint presentations with the U.S. and 
UK at the Meeting of Experts in 2009 and a joint 
presentation with the U.S. on Southern Caucasus 
Partner  ships in Countering Biological Th  reats in 2010). 
On the sides of the 2010 BWC Meeting of Experts, 
Georgia also presented at the First European Union Joint 
Action Workshop, on “Practicalities for BWC Implemen-
tation and Conﬁ   dence Building Measures Reporting,” 
since technical assistance and exchanges of experience 
gained from preparing the annual CBM reports can 
increase compliance with voluntary reporting and 
strengthen the BWC through increased transparency and 
openness.
Th   e strategic vision for an eﬀ  ective and comprehensive 
framework for biological risk management in Georgia 
(comprising biosafety and biosecurity) involves a set of 
regulations on biosecurity (based on the U.S. Select 
Agents Rule and similarly covering facilities and perso  n-
nel registration, security risk assessments, emergency 
response, record keeping, inspections, duties of Respon-
sible Oﬃ   cial,  training,  notiﬁ   cations for theft, loss or 
release, etc); biosafety norms (consistent with the “Bio-
safety in Microbiological and Biomedical Labora  tories” 
guidance published by the U.S. Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention [CDC] and the WHO “Labora-
tory Biosafety Manual”); regulations for import, export, 
containment, transfer, and handling of biological agents 
and toxins; and guidelines for safe transportation of 
infectious substances and diagnostic materials.
To that end, and in accordance with the NCDC statute 
which speciﬁ   es “participation in preparing normative 
and methodological documentation under its compe  ten-
cies,” experts from the NCDC Department of Biosafety 
and Th   reat Reduction and other institutions of MOHLSA 
have prepared a draft model law with the components 
mentioned above, in consultation with personnel from 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), and U.S. 
Depart  ment of State. However, this eﬀ   ort could only 
partly be completed since other pertinent legislative 
eﬀ  orts should be pursued in parallel (for instance those 
regarding the criminal code and also the administrative 
code of Georgia, which will contribute to deterrence by 
increasing the penalties for misuse, theft, and diversion 
of biological agents). A close collaboration among the 
public health, law enforcement, the judicial branch and 
other stakeholders is necessary to ensure that the 
biological risk management framework is viewed holis-
tically in the context of the national legislative system.
Th   e recently revised legislation on public health (adopted 
on 27 June 2007) currently speciﬁ  es in its Chapter V, 
“Providing Biosecurity/ Biosafety,” the relevant measures, 
authorities and responsibilities in these areas, as follows:
•  Cl.16 – Providing Biosecurity/Biosafety;
•  Cl.17 – Limitation of Posession, Use, Transfer, 
Transportation and Destruction of Causative Agents of 
Especially Dangerous Infections;
•  Cl.18 – Destruction of Causative Agents of Especially 
Dangerous Infections;
• Cl.19 – Import and Export of Causative Agents of 
Especially Dangerous Infections;
• Cl.20 – Institutions Responsibilities on Biosafety/
Biosecurity;
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Detection, Surveillance and Response to Causative 
Agents of Especially Dangerous Infections.
In addition to drafting and implementing pertinent 
legislation, Georgia is collaborating with the United 
States on enhancing its biosafety and biosecurity by 
training its workforce and improving its biological 
infrastructure. Th  e Defense Th  reat Reduction Agency 
(DTRA) is leading in Georgia the Cooperative Biological 
Engagement Program (CBEP) aimed at reducing the 
biological risk by securing/consolidating pathogens, 
training scientists in biosafety and biosecurity tech-
niques, and regulatory reform; establishing a sustainable 
detection, response, and communication network to 
monitor biological outbreaks; and undertaking co  opera-
tive biological research projects to understand disease 
baseline, increase transparency, encourage higher ethics 
standards, and strengthen the integration of scientists 
into the international community.
Georgia is also closely collaborating with the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services. Th   e CDC is 
working to help strengthen the public health systems of 
Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan by improving each 
country’s disease detection response and control through 
improvements in laboratory systems, epidemiology 
workforce, and public health management skills. For 
instance, the South Caucasus Regional Field Epidemio-
logy and Laboratory Training Program (FELTP) is based 
at NCDC in Tbilisi, Georgia, but also involves the 
neighboring countries of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Th  e 
two-year in-service training program in applied epide-
miology and public health laboratory practice trains 
residents in ﬁ   eld epidemiology and public health 
laboratory for leadership positions in various levels of 
their respective ministries of health or agriculture. Th  e 
FELTPs have a strong focus on biosafety and biosecurity.
Georgia supports the USNCR 1540 and submitted its 
report on national measures taken in implementation of 
its goals on 28 October 2004 with additional information 
provided to the 1540 Committee on 28 January 2006. Th  e 
report outlined the legislative framework in Georgia; 
measures taken with regard to nonproliferation of chemi-
cal and biological weapons and disposal of radioactive 
sources; the introduction of Georgian system of export 
control of dual use materials, equipment and tech-
nologies; and the series of bilateral agreements with the 
United States on preventing the proliferation of WMD 
materials and technologies, counterterrorism, border 
security and export control. Georgia is also working on 
updating its legislation in order to cover all aspects of its 
obligations under the Resolution.
In addition to enhancing biosecurity and biosafety in 
Georgia through the IHR (2005), BWC and 1540 mecha-
nisms, Georgia also supports the European Security 
Strategy (“A secure Europe in a better world”) and the 
European Union Strategy against the Proliferation of 
WMD (“Eﬀ  ective multilateralism, prevention and inter-
national cooperation”), adopted by the European Council 
on 12 December 2003, which identify proliferation as one 
of the ﬁ   ve key challenges to international security, 
together with terrorism, regional conﬂ  icts, State failure, 
and organized crime.
Similarly, Georgia supports the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO)’s “Comprehensive, Strategic-Level 
Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of WMDs and 
Defending against CBRN Th   reats” of 2009, which focuses 
on prevention and strengthening international non-
proliferation mechanisms (i.e. BWC, UNSCR 1540, the 
Proliferation Security Initiative, etc.); and increased 
information exchange, engagement, cooperation, and 
joint training with Partner nations, international and 
regional organizations, and civilian entities.
International workshops and training in Georgia
Under the auspices of NATO’s Science for Peace 
Program, Georgia organized in June 2008 a workshop on 
“Emerging and endemic pathogens: advances in surveil-
lance detection, and identiﬁ  cation,” which was attended 
by more than 50 experts from 10 countries (Georgia, 
U.S., UK, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Macedonia, 
France, Germany and Azerbaijan).
Georgia also hosted and co-organized Th  e Southern 
Caucasus Workshop on Public Health, Security, and Law 
Enforcement Partnership in Bio-Incident Pre-Planning 
and Response and the associated Southern Caucasus 
BioShield 2010 Tabletop Exercise (TTX) which were held 
in Tbilisi, Georgia, 11-12 May 2010. Th   ese events were a 
joint eﬀ   ort of DTRA, HHS’s Oﬃ     ce of the Assistant 
Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), and 
Georgia’s NCDC [9].
Over 80 participants were in attendance at the May 2010 
meeting, from inter-governmental organizations (WHO, 
International Criminal Police Organization [INTERPOL], 
NATO), U.S. Government (DoD, HHS, Department of 
Energy, Department of State, and Federal Bureau of 
Investigation [FBI]), and from public health, security, or 
law enforcement organizations from Georgia, Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Romania. Non-
govern  mental organizations such as VERTIC (Veriﬁ  cation 
Research, Training and Information Centre), Bechtel, and 
Global Green USA also participated in these events.
Th   e workshop and tabletop exercise aimed to:
• Foster improved understanding of the respective 
proce  dures and requirements of public health, security, 
and law enforcement communities in response to a 
biological incident, and enhance their joint eﬀ  ective-
ness in pre-planning and response at the national and 
regional/international level;
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za  tions’ role and their interaction in the process of 
sharing information and coordinating the international 
response;
•  Emphasize the concept that information exchange in 
the early stages of a biological incident is critical to 
eﬀ   ectively containing the outbreak/mitigating the 
conse  quences of a biological incident and to appre-
hending the potential perpetrators;
•  Review existing legal and regulatory infrastructure of 
national measures consistent with the obligations 
under the BWC, UNSCR 1540, and IHR(2005) to deter, 
prevent, or respond to biological incidents or threats.
Th   ese events successfully linked the international 
response to a bioterrorism incident stemming from the 
convergence of criminal and terrorist networks, with 
prevention via the nonproliferation mechanisms des-
cribed in this paper:
• Th  e BWC – by emphasizing the eﬀ  ective prohibition 
of the development, production, acquisition, transfer, 
retention, stockpiling and use of biological and toxin 
weapons and highlighting the treaty as a key element 
in the international community’s eﬀ  orts to address the 
proliferation of WMD;
•  UNSCR 1540 – by emphasizing the requirement that 
all UN Member States refrain from providing support 
to non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire, 
manufacture, possess, transport or use nuclear, chemi-
cal or biological weapons and their means of delivery, 
and the obligation of Member States to establish and 
to enforce domestic controls to secure WMD-related 
materials and prevent their proliferation; and
• NATO’s Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy for 
Preventing the Proliferation of WMDs and Defending 
against CBRN Th  reats – by emphasizing its focus on 
prevention and strengthening international nonproli-
fera  tion mechanisms and increased information 
exchange, engagement, cooperation, and joint training 
with Partner nations, international and regional 
organi  zations, and civilian entities.
Conclusion
Th  e various international instruments described above 
are all part of the so-called “web of prevention” designed 
to address the multitude of security and health challenges 
of today’s world. Georgia is working toward building a 
culture of security and responsibility at the national and 
international level by involving civic, scientiﬁ  c,  and 
government capacities in its outreach events to facilitate 
a common understanding of the WMD threat and 
encourage participation in and compliance with inter-
national arms control, disarmament and non-
proliferation eﬀ  orts; enhance global eﬀ  orts to protect and 
defend against biological threats; and improve disease 
containment and response in case of outbreaks whether 
due to natural, accidental, or deliberate causes.
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